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Article
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika [Unity in Diversity]
—Indonesian national motto
The Basque Country, the Chechen separatist movement, the 
Tibetan monks, or the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and 
Syria—What these groups have in common is their desire to 
separate from the nations in which they are currently 
included. But separatism is not an easy process: Separatist 
movements often face resistance from the majority and are 
sometimes even violently suppressed. (Hartman & Hsiao, 
1988; Lyon & Uçarer, 2001). Yet, despite the widespread 
prevalence of separatist movements, there is a striking lack 
of psychological research into the majority’s response to 
separatism. Media images of forceful suppression of separat-
ist movements such as those in Chechnya or Tibet may lead 
us to conclude that the majority typically responds in an 
aggressive manner. However, this impression may be mis-
leading because peaceful responses are far less likely to draw 
worldwide media attention. The aim of the current study was 
to examine the likelihood of a peaceful response to separat-
ism. We demonstrate that members of the majority experi-
ence separatist movements as a threat to the integrity and 
continuation of their national identity. Moreover, we show 
that they can respond to these feelings of threat by support-
ing government measures aimed at helping the separatist 
group.
Separatism is defined by the Oxford English Reference 
Dictionary as “the advocacy of a state of cultural, ethnic, 
tribal, religious, racial, governmental or gender separation 
from the larger group” (Pearsall & Trumble, 1996). As such, 
it includes a wide range of schisms, although the term is most 
commonly associated with national separations. Sani and 
colleagues studied the motives underlying schismatic pro-
cesses in two Italian political parties and in the Church of 
England (Sani, 2008; Sani & Reicher, 1998; Sani & Todman, 
2002). They demonstrate that the intention to separate from 
the majority is rooted in the perception that the majority’s 
norms and values are incongruent with the separatist group’s 
social identity (Sani & Reicher, 1998; Sani & Todman, 2002) 
and that the separatist groups feel estranged from the major-
ity (Sani, 2008). This is captured in the term “identity sub-
version,” which refers to a sense that the group’s essence has 
been undermined by changes introduced by the majority. 
Perceptions of identity subversion were found to decrease 
the extent to which the group was seen as a homogenous 
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entity and the extent to which members identified with the 
group (Sani & Pugliese, 2008).
Although subgroups with separatist intentions may feel 
that there is no future for them within the majority group, 
worldwide anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that the 
majority group often does not feel the same way and actively 
opposes separatist tendencies. We propose that the knowl-
edge that part of one’s nation has plans to split off and con-
tinue as an independent unit constitutes a form of identity 
threat to members of the majority. The social groups that 
people belong to can form a basis for self-definition and 
self-esteem (Brewer, 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, 
& Wetherell, 1987), and nationality, in particular, is an 
important part of our identity (Schildkraut, 2011). Changes 
in the nature or composition of a valued group require fun-
damental alterations to the meaning of group members’ 
social identity, and this can cause resistance (Ethier & 
Deaux, 1994). Although separatism or schisms have never 
been studied in this regard, research on mergers and organi-
zational restructures provides valuable insights into people’s 
reactions to fundamental changes to the composition of their 
group. The general finding is that people tend to resist fun-
damental changes to the composition of their organization 
or department (Boen, Vanbeselaere, Brebels, Huybens, & 
Millet, 2007; Giessner, 2011; Jetten, O’Brien, & Trindall, 
2002; Terry, Carey, & Callan, 2001; Ullrich & van Dick, 
2007), and they do so more strongly to the extent that they 
experience the merger as a change to, rather than a continu-
ation of, their premerger organizational identity (Giessner, 
2011; Gleibs, Mummendey, & Noack, 2008; Ullrich, 
Wieseke, & van Dick, 2005; van Leeuwen, van Knippenberg, 
& Ellemers, 2003). Giessner (2011) described a sense of 
continuity as “a general feeling that the merged organisation 
is a continuation of the pre-merger organisation” (p. 1080). 
Research has demonstrated that a strong sense of continuity 
inhibits the detrimental effects of a merger on employees’ 
postmerger attachment to the organization. Similar evidence 
is obtained with respect to the merging of countries—for 
example, the German reunification (Wenzel, Mummendey, 
& Waldzus, 2007).
Because separatism involves the separation of a subgroup 
from a nation, members of the majority may experience this 
separation as a fundamental change to their national identity. 
That part of the nation that intends to separate from the 
majority may represent an important part of the nation’s cul-
ture, as reflected in, for example, it’s unique geography, his-
tory, language, or cuisine. Separation would imply that all 
these features no longer contribute to the majority’s national 
identity, which requires members of the majority to redefine 
themselves as members of their nation. Given the importance 
of a sense of continuity as demonstrated in merger-research, 
the belief that one’s nation could fundamentally change if the 
separatist group is successful in gaining independence may 
threaten majority members’ sense of identity continuity. We 
thus propose that, to members of the majority, separatist 
movements constitute a threat to the continuation and integ-
rity of their national identity (continuation threat).
Existing literature has identified many possible responses 
to identity threat, ranging from disidentification to discrimi-
nation (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; 
Hutchison, Jetten, Christian, & Haycraft, 2006). Recently, 
however, van Leeuwen and Täuber (2010) proposed that 
helping can also be an effective (and peaceful) response to 
identity threat. They argued that helping is often a form of 
strategic communication in which the helper can signal to the 
recipient important in-group qualities such as warmth 
(Mashuri, Zaduqisti, & Supriyono, 2012; van Leeuwen & 
Täuber, 2012), or competence (van Leeuwen & Täuber, 
2011). Research demonstrated that people try to correct neg-
ative images of their group by presenting themselves as help-
ful and generous (Hopkins et al., 2007; van Leeuwen & 
Täuber, 2012). Helping can also be used as a means of com-
municating information about the desired relationship with 
the recipient, as examined in the context of power and domi-
nance relations. For example, groups that seek to control 
other groups provide specific forms of help (i.e., dependency 
oriented help) to affirm and strengthen the recipient group’s 
dependency on the helper (Nadler, Harpaz-Gorodeisky, & 
Ben-David, 2009), whereas groups in need of help may 
refrain from seeking help from other groups with which they 
have a troublesome relationship (van Leeuwen, Täuber, & 
Sassenberg, 2011). Based on these findings, we propose that 
helping can also be used to communicate a desire to establish 
or restore a positive relationship with another group. This is 
because helping itself is viewed as an act of kindness 
(Hopkins et al., 2007), and people who help others can gen-
erate liking, trust, and respect (Alvarez & van Leeuwen, 
2011). To the extent that separatist groups threaten the conti-
nuity of a national identity, members of the majority may be 
motivated to help the separatist group to signal that this 
group is valued and appreciated and that it should remain 
included.
The Present Research
We examined the notion that helping can be used as a tool to 
negate the threat caused by the separatist movement in two 
studies conducted in the Republic of Indonesia. In Indonesia, 
the two most active separatist movements are the West Papua 
Freedom Movement (OPM) in West Papua and the Aceh 
Freedom Movement (GAM) in Aceh. Papuans and Acehnese 
have been struggling for independence for decades, using 
peaceful and violent means, and likewise facing peaceful and 
nonpeaceful responses from the Indonesian government and 
military (Miller, 2009).
We recognize that a potential change to the nature and 
integrity of the Indonesian national identity is not the only 
threat the Indonesian majority faces if either West Papua or 
Aceh were to secede. Both provinces have rich natural 
resources. West Papua is home to the world’s largest gold 
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reserves and vast reserves of copper (Budiardjo, 2005), and 
Aceh houses large reserves of oil and natural gas. If either 
becomes economically independent from the Republic of 
Indonesia, the economic consequences for Indonesia would 
be considerable. When the separatist group possesses valu-
able natural or human resources, its separation from the 
majority can drain the latter’s wealth and threaten its eco-
nomic position—a type of threat we will refer to as eco-
nomic threat. Although feelings of economic threat could 
also be reduced through attempts to persuade the separatist 
group to change their mind (i.e., through helping), we 
believe that a prosocial response to economic threat is less 
likely. Research has shown that economic or realistic threat 
triggers competition over scarce resources, which fosters 
group conflict (Campbell, 1965; Esses, Jackson, & 
Armstrong, 1998). Economic competition is also known to 
debilitate intergroup helping exchanges (Jackson & Esses, 
1997; van Leeuwen et al., 2011). It is therefore unlikely that 
economic threat will be a positive predictor of the willing-
ness to help the separatist group.
Overview of the Studies
Participants in both studies were Javanese students, repre-
senting the nonseparatist majority group. Java is the home 
of approximately 60% of the Indonesian population; it 
includes the nation’s capital Jakarta, and generally domi-
nates Indonesia politically, economically, and culturally. 
Participants were induced to believe that existing separatist 
movements in West Papua (Study 1) or Aceh (Study 2) were 
currently decreasing (low call for separatism) or increasing 
(high call for separatism) their efforts to gain independence. 
We subsequently measured perceived threat to the continua-
tion of the Indonesian national identity, perceived economic 
threat, and participants’ support for governmental measures 
to help the separatist group. We predicted that participants in 
the high call for separatism condition would experience 
more continuation threat and economic threat than partici-
pants in the low call for separatism condition (Hypothesis 1). 
We further predicted that participants in the high call for 
separatism condition would express more support for help-
ing the separatist group than participants in the low call for 
separatism condition (Hypothesis 2a). Moreover, we pre-
dicted that this effect would be mediated by continuation 
threat (Hypothesis 2b).
Study 1
The aim of the first study was to investigate the notion that 
members of the Indonesian majority would express more 
support for helping the separatist group when they experi-
enced a threat to the continuation of their national identity. 
This prediction was based on the assumption that helping 
signals warmth and kindness (cf. Hopkins et al., 2007; van 
Leeuwen & Täuber, 2012). However, it is also possible that 
separatism increases the desire to help as a means of reassert-
ing control over the separatist group and demonstrating dom-
inance (cf. Nadler et al., 2009), which could have been 
undermined by the call for separatism. We, therefore, 
included a measure of control in this study for exploratory 
reasons, to investigate participants’ motivation to exert 
power and control over the separatist group.
Method
Participants and design. Three hundred and two students (94 
men and 199 women, 9 participants did not specify their gen-
der; M
age
 = 20.42, SD
age
 = 1.34) from the Islamic University 
of Pekalongan and the Islamic University of Surabaya, in 
Java, Indonesia, participated on a voluntary basis. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: low 
call for separatism (n = 153) or high call for separatism (n = 
149).
Procedure. Participants were addressed by an assistant 
researcher in their classrooms either before or after class, 
who asked them to participate in a brief paper-and-pencil 
study. The researcher did not provide information regarding 
the study’s background or purpose at this point. They were 
first instructed to read a newspaper article, ostensibly from a 
respectable national newspaper, describing the current call 
for separatism in the Indonesian province of West Papua. In 
the low separatism threat condition, the article stated that the 
call for separatism in West Papua had decreased over the past 
decade and was expected to decrease further in the near 
future. In the high separatism threat condition, separatism 
was described to be on the rise in Papua and expected to 
further increase to unprecedented levels.
The article was followed up by a questionnaire. Unless 
otherwise indicated, all variables were assessed on 5-point 
scales on which participants were asked to indicate their 
agreement with a statement (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). 
Scales were created by averaging the items. The effective-
ness of the manipulation was checked with 2 items 
(“WestPapua’s desire for independence from Indonesia has 
leveled off over the last decade” [reverse coded]; “It is 
expected that the number of Papuans who call for indepen-
dence will further increase”; r = .72). We further assessed 
continuation threat (4 items, for example, “I fear that the cur-
rent political situation in West-Papua can change Indonesia’s 
future profile and existence,” “I am concerned that the cur-
rent political situation in West-Papua can turn Indonesia into 
something different than before”; α = .77) and economic 
threat (4 items, for example, “I fear that the current political 
situation in West-Papua can debilitate Indonesia’s economic 
power,” “I fear that the current political situation in West-
Papua can restrict Indonesia’s future access to West-Papua’s 
natural resources”; α = .82). Exploratory factor analysis with 
OBLIMIN rotation confirmed that the threat items assessed 
two separate constructs (together explaining 63% of the total 
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variance, all factor loadings were above .59, crossloadings 
were below .32).
Support for helping West Papua was subsequently mea-
sured by assessing participants’ support for eight measures 
that the Indonesian government could take to improve West 
Papua’s current economic and political position. (e.g., “The 
Indonesian government should allocate more financial 
resources to West-Papua,” “The Indonesian government 
should enhance the quality of education, healthcare, and pub-
lic infrastructure in West-Papua”; α = .65). The degree to 
which participants felt that their government should exert 
control over the help provided to the separatist group was 
assessed with five items that were based on van Leeuwen 
(2007; for example, “It is very important that the control of 
help to the Papuans is in the hands of the Indonesian govern-
ment instead of the local government,” “The Indonesian gov-
ernment should have monitoring teams since the Papuans are 
unable to appropriately comprehend and use the tools handed 
to them” [R]; α = .73).1 Upon finishing, participants were 
thanked and debriefed.
Results and Conclusion
Unless otherwise indicated, the reported analyses are sepa-
rate univariate analyses of variance with call for separatism 
as independent variable.
Manipulation check. Analysis of the manipulation check 
demonstrated that the manipulation was successful, F(1, 
300) = 253.50, p < .001, η
p
2 = .46. Participants in the high call 
for separatism condition reported a higher perceived ten-
dency for West Papua to separate (M = 3.97, SD = .98) than 
participants in the low call for separatism condition (M = 
2.17, SD = .97).
Perceived threat. The separatism manipulation affected con-
tinuation threat, F(1, 300) = 11.21, p < .001, η
p
2 = .04, as well 
as economic threat, F(1, 300) = 15.16, p < .001, η
p
2 = .05, in 
the expected direction—that is, participants in the high call 
for separatism condition reported higher levels of continua-
tion threat (M = 3.48, SD = .94) and economic threat (M = 
3.62, SD = .91) compared with participants in the low call for 
separatism condition (continuation threat, M = 3.13, SD = 
.88; economic threat, M = 3.19, SD = .98).
Support for helping. Call for separatism had a significant 
effect on participants’ support for helping West Papua, F(1, 
300) = 4.42, p = .036, η
p
2 = .02. In line with Hypothesis 1, 
participants in the high call for separatism condition were 
more in favor of helping West Papua (M = 3.49, SD = .62) 
than those in the low call for separatism condition (M = 3.35, 
SD = .54).
Support for helping was regressed on continuation threat 
and economic threat. As expected, only continuation 
threat emerged as a significant predictor of support for 
helping, β = .32, t = 4.95, and p < .001. Economic threat, β = 
.01, t = 0.09, and p = .94, was unrelated to support for help-
ing.2 We used the bootstrap approach to examine whether the 
observed effect of call for separatism on support for helping 
was mediated by perceived continuation threat. Following 
recommendations, we resampled 5,000 times (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008). Confirming Hypothesis 2, zero fell outside the 
95% confidence interval (which ranged from .0139 to .0612), 
demonstrating that perceived continuation threat mediated 
the effect of call for separatism on support for helping.
Control. No effect was found on the degree to which partici-
pants wanted their government to coordinate and stay in con-
trol over the help provided to the separatist group, F(1, 
300) = .073, p = .788, η
p
2 = .00. Although participants in gen-
eral expressed a moderate desire for control (M = 3.82, SD = 
.66), participants in the high call for separatism condition did 
not express a greater desire for control (M = 3.81, SD = .70) 
than participants in the low call for separatism condition 
(M = 3.83, SD = .63).
Conclusion. The results provide full support for the prediction 
that the call for separatism can increase support for helping 
the separatist movement. Moreover, as expected, continua-
tion threat but not economic threat mediated this effect. We 
also found that participants in the high call for separatism 
condition did not wish their government to exert more con-
trol over the separatist group than those in the low call for 
separatism condition did. Although null effects should 
always be interpreted with caution, this observation seems to 
speak against an alternative explanation for our findings in 
terms of regaining control and asserting dominance.
Study 2
We argued in the general introduction to this article that peo-
ple could express support for helping the separatist group to 
send a signal that they would like it to remain included within 
the majority. The results from the first study are in line with 
this reasoning but do not conclusively demonstrate the com-
municative nature of helping. For example, because helping 
implies that one’s group is valued and needed (van Leeuwen, 
2007), helping could also stem from a desire to restore the 
meaningfulness of a national identity that was threatened by 
the rejection by a small subgroup (Williams & Nida, 2011). 
The goal of the second study was therefore to demonstrate 
the communicative nature of helping, which we attempted to 
achieve in two ways.
First, we reasoned that if helping is a means of commu-
nication, it would only be effective when directed at the 
separatist target. We therefore compared support for help-
ing of a separatist group with support for helping of an 
unrelated, nonseparatist group by manipulating the target of 
help. We expected that our manipulation of the strength of 
the call for separatism would increase support for helping 
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the separatist group but would not affect support for help-
ing the nonseparatist group (Hypothesis 3). Moreover, the 
effect of the call for separatism on support for helping was 
expected to be mediated by perceived continuation threat 
among participants who could support the separatist group, 
but not among those who could only support a nonseparat-
ist group (Hypothesis 4).
Second, if support for helping is indeed a signal to the 
separatist group that it should remain included, the degree to 
which participants express their support to help the separatist 
group should increase the perceived inclusion of this group 
within the larger nation—that is, the more participants who 
fear separation actually express their support for helping the 
separatist group, the more firmly they will view this group as 
still included within the nation. To this end, we assessed per-
ceived inclusion of the separatist group directly following 
the helping measure. We predicted that the effect of separat-
ism threat on perceived inclusion would be mediated by the 
degree to which people expressed their support for helping 
the separatist group (Hypothesis 5).
This study also included an exploratory measure of par-
ticipants’ desire for the separatist group to remain included 
within the broader Republic of Indonesia. This measure 
allows us to investigate the assumption that support for gov-
ernmental help of the separatist group results from a desire to 
keep this group included.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred and eighty students (58 
men and 106 women, 16 participants did not specify their 
gender; M
age
 = 20.35, SD
age
 = 1.41) from the Islamic Univer-
sity of Pekalongan in Java, Indonesia, participated on a vol-
untary basis. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
cells of a 2 (call for separatism: low vs. high) × 2 (help target: 
irrelevant vs. relevant) between participants experimental 
design.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in the first study, 
with a few exceptions. The separatist province presented in 
the newspaper article as having an increasing (high call for 
separatism) or decreasing (low call for separatism) desire to 
separate from Indonesia was Bandah Aceh. Aceh, like Papua, 
has been expressing a desire for more autonomy for decades 
(Miller, 2004). Participants were informed of an educational 
crisis in Aceh (relevant target condition) or in South Kali-
mantan (irrelevant target condition), where poor financial 
circumstances made it impossible to provide even the most 
basic facilities for education, including housing and school-
books (a procedure identical to that used by van Leeuwen & 
Mashuri, 2012). We chose Aceh over West Papua in this 
study because of its comparability to South Kalimantan 
(Suryadinata, Arifin, & Ananta, 2003), as both have a pre-
dominantly Muslim population, and both are replete with 
natural resources. Contrary to Aceh, South Kalimantan has 
never expressed a desire for more autonomy. We opted for 
help with an educational crisis over general help (as in Study 
1) because the latter may be construed differently when 
aimed at a separatist province (where it could be seen as a 
way of helping the separatist province reintegrate) compared 
with a nonseparatist province.
In the subsequent questionnaire, we assessed the effec-
tiveness of the manipulation (r = .74), continuation threat (α 
= .83), and realistic threat (α = .80), using the same scales as 
in Study 1. Participants could then indicate, in eight items, to 
what extent they believed that the Indonesian government 
should help Aceh/South Kalimantan with its educational cri-
sis (e.g., “The Indonesian government should provide finan-
cial support for the purchase of new schoolbooks for primary 
and secondary schools in Aceh/South Kalimantan,” “The 
Indonesian government should provide financial support for 
building additional primary and secondary schools in Aceh/
South Kalimantan”; 1 = not at all, 5 = very much; α = .83). 
Perceived inclusion was subsequently measured with 4 items 
(e.g., “I think that the Acehnese are as typical for Indonesia 
as other ethnic groups in Indonesia,” “I think Indonesia is 
nothing without the Acehnese”; 1 = not at all, 5 = very much), 
as well as with a graphic scale depicting the relationship 
between Aceh and other Indonesian provinces, represented 
by several circles (1 = highly dispersed, 5 = highly overlap-
ping). Because the items and the graphic scale loaded on a 
single factor in PCA (eigenvalue = 2.22), we combined them 
into one scale (after z-transformation; α = .68). Participants’ 
desire for the separatist group to remain included within the 
Republic of Indonesia was measured with three items (e.g., 
“If Aceh wants to separate from Indonesia, that is fine with 
me” [R], “I hope that Aceh will always be faithful to 
Indonesia”; 1 = not at all, 5 = very much; α = .73). At the end 
of the study, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results and Conclusion
Unless otherwise indicated, the reported analyses are sepa-
rate univariate analyses of variance with call for separatism 
and help target as independent variables.
Manipulation check. The manipulation check was affected by 
call for separatism only, F(1, 176) = 73.94, p < .001, η
p
2 = .30. 
Participants in the high call for separatism condition reported 
a higher perceived tendency for Aceh to separate (M = 3.80, 
SD = 1.22) than those in the low call for separatism condition 
(M = 2.25, SD = 1.18).
Perceived threat. Perceived continuation threat, F(1, 176) = 
10.63, p = .001, η
p
2 = .06, and realistic threat, F(1, 176) = 
41.89, p < .001, η
p
2 = .20, were affected by call for separatism 
only. Participants in the high call for separatism condition 
reported higher levels of continuation threat (M = 3.47, SD = 
1.05), and realistic threat (M = 3.84, SD = 0.74) compared 
with those in the low call for separatism condition 
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(continuation threat, M = 2.91, SD = .80; realistic threat, M = 
3.00, SD = .94).
Support for helping. We observed a main effect of help target 
on support for helping Aceh/South Kalimantan, F(1, 176) = 
4.66, p = .032, η
p
2 = .03, which was fully qualified by the 
predicted interaction term, F(1, 176) = 5.86, p = .017, η
p
2 = 
.03. The means are presented in Figure 1. Tests for the simple 
main effect of call for separatism within each level of help 
target demonstrated that among participants who could sup-
port helping the relevant target of Aceh, more support was 
observed in the high call for separatism condition compared 
with the low call for separatism condition, F(1, 176) = 10.60, 
p = .001, η
p
2 = .06. No effect of call for separatism was found 
among participants who could support helping the irrelevant 
target of South Kalimantan, F(1, 176) = .03, n.s. These find-
ings support Hypothesis 3.
Support for helping was regressed on perceived continua-
tion threat and perceived realistic threat. As in the first study, 
only continuation threat emerged as a significant predictor of 
support for helping, β = .26, t = 2.99, and p =.003, whereas 
realistic threat, β = −.15, t = −1.74, and p = .08, was unrelated 
to helping. To test Hypothesis 4, we conducted a moderated 
mediation analysis using the bootstrap approach (cf. Model 
3, Preacher & Hayes, 2008), resampling 5,000 times. As pre-
dicted, perceived continuation threat mediated the effect of 
call for separatism on support for helping within the relevant 
target condition (boot indirect effect = 0.04, SE = 0.02, z = 
2.05, p = .041, 95% CI = [−.0237, .0462]) but not within the 
irrelevant target condition (boot indirect effect = 0.01, SE = 
0.01, z = 0.65, n.s., 95% CI = [.0119, .0882]).
Perceived inclusion. We observed main effects of call for sepa-
ratism, F(1, 176) = 8.30, p = .004, η
p
2 = .05, and help target, 
F(1, 176) = 8.91, p = .003, η
p
2 = .05, on the degree to which 
Aceh was viewed as included within the Republic of 
Indonesia. However, these effects were fully qualified by the 
significant interaction term, F(1, 176) = 4.08, p = .045, η
p
2 = 
.02. Among those who could express support for helping the 
relevant target of Aceh, participants in the high call for sepa-
ratism condition viewed Aceh as significantly more included 
(M = .37, SD = .66) compared with those in the low call for 
separatism condition (M = −0.09, SD = 0.57), F(1, 176) = 
11.62, p = .001, η
p
2 = .06. Among participants who could 
express support for helping the irrelevant target of South 
Kalimantan, no difference was found between the high call 
for separatism condition (M = −0.10, SD = 0.67) and the low 
call for separatism condition (M = −0.18, SD = 0.64), F(1, 
176) = .38, n.s.
We subsequently conducted a mediation analysis using 
the bootstrap approach (5,000 samples) to investigate the 
degree to which perceived inclusion of Aceh within Indonesia 
was mediated by support for helping. Zero fell outside the 
95% confidence interval, which ranged from .0072 to .0646. 
This supports Hypothesis 5 in demonstrating that support for 
helping mediated the interaction effect of call for separatism 
and help target on perceived inclusion of the separatist 
group—that is, the more participants expressed support for 
helping the separatist group, the more firmly they viewed 
this group as included within the nation.
Desire for inclusion. Participants’ desire for Aceh to remain 
included within Indonesia was unaffected by the manipula-
tions (all Fs < 1). We subsequently regressed support for 
helping on the desire for inclusion, call for separatism, help 
target, and all possible interaction terms to investigate to 
what extent support for help was predicted by the desire for 
the separatist group to stay included. The analysis yielded a 
marginally significant three-way interaction term, β = .14, t = 
1.90, and p = .059. Simple slope analysis revealed that the 
desire for Aceh to remain included was a marginally signifi-
cant predictor of support for help among participants in the 
high call for separatism, relevant target condition, β = .12, t = 
1.66, and p = .098. This observation provides tentative sup-
port for the reasoning that helping in this condition is an 
expression of a desire to keep the separatist group included 
within the larger group. Desire for inclusion was also mar-
ginally related to support for helping in the low call for sepa-
ratism, irrelevant target condition, β = .12, t = 1.67, and p = 
.096, but not in any of the other conditions (all ps > .50).
Conclusion. The results support the strategic use of helping as 
a mean to reduce the threat to the continuation and integrity 
of the national identity, as triggered by the call for separat-
ism. Continuation threat triggered by the separatist move-
ment increased the desire to help the separatist movement 
but not another, unrelated province. Moreover, participants 
who expressed their support for helping the separatist move-
ment subsequently viewed this group as more firmly included 
within the nation. Exploratory additional analyses further 
showed a trend indicating that participants’ desire to keep the 
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Figure 1. Support for helping is affected by call for separatism 
and help target (Study 2).
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separatist group included within the nation predicted their 
support for helping this group.
General Discussion
Separatism as a phenomenon receives frequent and wide-
spread media attention but is barely covered in psychological 
investigations. A few researchers have studied the motives 
underlying separatist movements, demonstrating that the 
intention to separate from the majority is rooted in the per-
ception that the majority’s norms and values are incongruent 
with the separatist group’s social identity (Sani & Todman, 
2002) and that separatist groups feel estranged from the 
majority (Sani, 2008). However, no research to date has stud-
ied the majority’s response to separatism. These insights are 
important because the dynamics of separatism and, in par-
ticular, the question whether the process of separatism is a 
peaceful or violent one are determined as much by the sepa-
ratist movement’s actions as by the majority’s response to 
this movement. The current research aimed to fill this gap by 
demonstrating that the majority group (a) experiences sepa-
ratism as a threat to the continuation and integrity of their 
national identity and to their economy and (b) can respond in 
a peaceful manner by helping the separatist group, thereby 
expressing its desire for the separatist group to remain 
included. Previous research has demonstrated the power of 
helping as a communicative tool (e.g., Hopkins et al., 2007; 
Nadler & Halabi, 2006; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2011, 2012), 
but this is the first study to demonstrate that the communica-
tive nature of helping can effectively negate a threat to the 
continuation and integrity of the national identity.
One important limitation of the current research is that 
we did not directly assess the extent to which helping the 
separatist group effectively reduced feelings of continuation 
threat that were triggered by the call for separatism. 
Although the results from the second study demonstrated 
that participants in the high call for separatism condition 
viewed the separatist group as more firmly included after 
expressing their support for help of that group, the study 
contained neither a baseline measure of perceived inclusion 
nor a follow-up measure of perceived continuation threat. 
We can therefore conclude that perceived continuation 
threat increased the desire to help the separatist group, but 
we cannot state conclusively that support for government 
help of the separatist group significantly decreased these 
feelings of threat. This is an issue that should be addressed 
in future research.
An additional limitation is that we did not study the effec-
tiveness of helping in actually reducing the separatist group’s 
call for separation—that is, we demonstrated that members 
of the majority view the separatist group as more firmly 
included within the nation after helping, but we do not know 
whether the separatist group would, in actuality, reduce its 
call for separatism in response to the majority’s help. This 
should be a focal point in future research. On the one hand, 
prior research suggests that an offer of help could improve 
intergroup relations. People who help others tend to generate 
liking, trust, and respect (Alvarez & van Leeuwen, 2011), 
and helping is often used to improve the public image of a 
group (Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009; Hopkins et al., 
2007). On the other hand, research has shown that offers of 
help, even when well-intended, are easily interpreted by the 
recipient group as strategic attempts to assert dominance 
(Halabi & Nadler, 2010; Nadler & Halabi, 2006). The will-
ingness to receive help from another group declines dramati-
cally in contexts characterized by conflict and competition 
(van Leeuwen et al., 2011). The effectiveness of helping as a 
strategy to persuade the separatist movement to remain 
included thus appears at least partially dependent on the 
degree to which the gesture is interpreted as an act of kind-
ness or as a means of asserting dominance.
Data from two studies showed that separatist movements 
trigger feelings of continuation threat and economic threat, but 
only continuation threat mediated the effect of the call for 
separatism on helping. We believe that feelings of economic 
threat may be more likely to engender a conflictual response 
than a peaceful response. Economic threat implies that the 
separatist movement will harm the majority by draining the 
nation’s valuable resources. This could trigger a competitive 
orientation in which the likelihood of reciprocating in a non-
peaceful manner is increased (Cikara, Botvinick, & Fiske, 
2011; Esses et al., 1998). The current research was designed to 
measure the likelihood of peaceful responses to separatism, 
but future research should investigate what factors can lead up 
to nonpeaceful responses, including aggression and conflict.
In both our studies, we assessed the willingness to help 
the outgroup through participants’ support for government 
measures. This dependent variable could be criticized on the 
basis that it does reflect actual behavior. Expressing support 
for government policy does not involve much personal cost 
and may therefore not always translate into actual behavior. 
However, it is in fact quite difficult to assess actual inter-
group behavior, particularly with respect to large groups. 
Donating money or volunteering time and effort are clear 
expressions of behavior, but as they are essentially behaviors 
expressed by individuals, they can be criticized for not 
reflecting intergroup processes. For example, if we had asked 
participants to personally donate money to the people of 
WestPapua or Aceh, helping could also be interpreted as an 
individual strategy, by demonstrating genuine concern for 
the separatist group, in contrast to a possible presumed lack 
of caring for this group by the national government or mili-
tary (see van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2012). We opted for the 
current measures because we reasoned that intergroup behav-
ior where large groups are concerned is often reflected in the 
actions of group representatives, such as governments, and 
(democratic) governments depend on the support of the peo-
ple they represent.
Given that psychologists have virtually ignored separat-
ism as a topic of study (but see Sani, 2008; Sani & Pugliese, 
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2008), and in particular the majority’s response to separatism 
movements, there are many avenues in this domain that 
deserve further exploration. For example, drawing on social 
exclusion literature (Williams, 2002; Williams & Nida, 
2011), future research could investigate to what extent both 
the separatist movement, as well as the majority in response 
to the separatist movement, feel rejected, thereby threatening 
the four basic needs of belonging, self-esteem, control, and 
meaningful existence. One fundamental difference between 
social exclusion of individuals and rejection of an entire 
group is that members of a rejected group can still experi-
ence a sense of belonging to their group. Although positive in 
the sense that this continued group membership can buffer 
against the negative consequences of being rejected, Williams 
and Nida (2011) suggested that it can also set into motion 
radicalism and intolerance, as well as the propensity and 
means to accomplish violent behavior. If this is true, it only 
further underlines the necessity for studying separatism con-
flict in more detail, with a particular focus on factors that can 
contribute to conflict de-escalation and resolution.
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Notes
1. Both studies reported in this article contained several addi-
tional measures that were included for exploratory purposes. 
Because none of these measures was affected by the manip-
ulations, and because the measures were not central to our 
research question, they were not reported in this article.
2. We also measured two other potential sources of threat in our 
questionnaire that could be activated by separatism threat. 
Given that “Unity in Diversity” (“Bhinneka Tunggal Ika”) is 
Indonesia’s national motto, we assessed the possibility that 
separatism threatens Indonesia’s ideology of unity in diver-
sity (four items; α = .90). Although the separatism manipula-
tion affected ideology threat in the expected direction, F(1, 
300) = 16.10, p < .001, ηp
2 = .05; M
high separatism threat
 = 3.72, SD = 
.98; M
low separatism threat
 = 3.23, SD = 1.15, ideology threat was 
unrelated to helping when controlling for continuation threat 
and economic threat, β = .12, t = 1.62, and p = .11. We also 
assessed the degree to which separatism threatens the perceived 
entitativity of the Republic of Indonesia (four items; α = .81), 
but entitativity threat was not affected by the separatism manip-
ulation, F(1, 300) = 2.01, p = .16, n.s.
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